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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RESTANI, Judge. 
 
Harry Lee Riddick, Jr. appeals his conviction following a 
jury trial. Riddick raises multiple claims including that 
there was a variance between the single conspiracy charged 
and the evidence produced at trial, there was insufficient 
evidence to support his continuing criminal enterprise 
("CCE") conviction, the Government both improperly 
disclosed and presented misleading grand jury testimony, 
the court erred in denying Riddick's suppression motion, 
and the Government conducted an unauthorized wiretap. 
The court affirms the conviction. 
 
The Government cross-appeals Riddick's sentence to a 
term of 33 years on the CCE count. The Government 
contends that the district court erred in assigning Riddick 
an offense level of 42 based on the United States 
Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, S 2D1.5 (Nov. 
1995) (hereinafter "USSG"), the guideline applicable to his 
CCE conviction, even though USSG S 2D1.2, the guideline 
applicable to his conviction for distribution of cocaine near 
a school, required a higher offense level of 43 and a 
mandatory life sentence. The court vacates the sentence 
and remands for resentencing.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Because a mandatory life sentence is required on the school count, 
the court does not reach the issue of whether the district court erred in 
refusing to sentence Riddick to the statutorily mandated term of life in 
prison for his CCE conviction as required by 21 U.S.C. S 848(b). 
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Factual Background 
 
This case began with an indictment against twenty three 
defendants who engaged in a drug distribution conspiracy 
in Pennsylvania from 1989 to 1994. The Government filed 
a superseding indictment in July 1994 against the original 
defendant and co-defendants, including Riddick. The 
indictment charged Riddick with one count of engaging in 
a continuing criminal enterprise (21 U.S.C. S 848(a)), one 
count of conspiring to distribute more than five kilograms 
of cocaine (21 U.S.C. S 846), thirteen counts of distributing 
cocaine in or near a school (21 U.S.C. S 860(a)), and one 
count of distribution of cocaine (21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1)). 
 
On February 6, 1996, a jury convicted Riddick on all  
counts.2 Following a sentencing hearing, the court found 
Riddick's CCE involved in excess of 150 kilograms of 
cocaine. The court based this finding on the Government's 
calculation that Riddick was responsible for in excess of 
350 kilograms, the probation officer's calculation which was 
in excess of 250 kilograms, and the court's own detailed 
assessment of the trial evidence, including evidence of the 
length of time of the conspiracy, the suppliers, the sellers, 
and the amount of cocaine distributed each week. 
 
The Government argued that Riddick should be 
sentenced under the Sentencing Guideline section resulting 
in the highest offense level within the group of counts. The 
Government reasoned that here, the conviction for 
distribution of cocaine near a school, rather than the 
conviction for operating a CCE, provided the higher offense 
level and life imprisonment. Moreover, the Government 
argued that the court was not precluded from sentencing 
Riddick on the distribution near a school counts because 
that offense is not a lesser included offense of the CCE 
count. The district court rejected this argument and held 
that "if you charge . . . continuing criminal enterprise, . . . 
that offense is so odious and so severe that if the 
Government secures a conviction on that offense, then the 
sentence should be imposed on that offense, even if it [is] 
not technically a lesser included offense." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Any facts relevant to Riddick's appeal of his conviction are discussed 
in Section I. 
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Thus, the court imposed a sentence of 33 years on the 
CCE count. The district court did not dismiss the 
remaining counts and did not sentence Riddick on them. 
This appeal followed. 
 
Jurisdiction 
 
The district court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. S 3231 (1994) because the case involved offenses 
against the laws of the United States. This court has 
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district 
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291 (1994). In addition, this 
court has jurisdiction over an appeal by the Government for 
review of a final sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3742(b) 
(1994). 
 
Discussion 
 
I. 
 
A. Variance 
 
Riddick claims that there was a prejudicial variance 
between the indictment and the trial evidence because he 
and co-defendant Shannon Riley were charged as members 
of a single conspiracy, but the trial evidence showed that 
they were members of separate conspiracies. It is 
undisputed that the indictment charged that Riddick, and 
all of his co-defendants including Shannon Riley, were part 
of a single conspiracy to distribute more than five kilograms 
of cocaine using Phill's Bar and Grill, Allentown, as a 
headquarters and safe haven for drug dealing. Thus, the 
only remaining question is whether the jury properly found 
the existence of a single conspiracy. The existence of a 
single conspiracy is a finding of fact that must be sustained 
if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
government, there is substantial evidence to support that 
finding. United States v. Smith, 789 F.2d 196, 200 (3d Cir. 
1986). 
 
The court finds that the Government presented 
substantial evidence supporting the jury's finding of a 
single conspiracy. The trial evidence showed that Riddick 
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and Riley closely cooperated and consulted each other to 
protect Riddick's ongoing cocaine operation. They supplied 
each other with information about law enforcement 
investigations. Riley used the "safe haven" that Riddick 
created at Phill's Bar and Grill to sell cocaine, which she 
was permitted to do only because she was associated with 
Riddick. Thus, there was no variance between the 
indictment and the evidence, both of which show a highly 
interdependent group of sellers who shared a unity of 
purpose and who were led by Riddick. 
 
B. CCE Conviction 
 
Riddick claims that there was insufficient evidence to 
support his conviction for operating a continuing criminal 
enterprise because the Government's evidence showed that 
Riddick supervised only two "runners," notfive or more 
persons as required by 21 U.S.C. S 848(c). 3 The court 
reviews the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the government and must credit all available 
inferences in favor of the government. United States v. 
Dickens, 695 F.2d 765, 779 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 
The court finds that the Government presented sufficient 
evidence to support Riddick's conviction for operating a 
CCE. The trial testimony shows that Riddick controlled 
more than five couriers and sellers. Riddick hired sellers, 
set daily guaranteed wages for sellers, set cocaine prices, 
provided pagers, and numerical identifier codes to his 
sellers, posted bail for arrested sellers, and obtained 
confidential police information to protect sellers. Riddick 
stationed certain sellers at Phill's Bar & Grill, where they 
had the right to sell cocaine. Other sellers sold door to 
door. Therefore, the testimony showed that Riddick had 
supervised numerous sellers in a unified drug ring. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Riddick also claims that the district court improperly admitted 
evidence of Nigel McFarlane's dealings with Dominican and Colombian 
drug dealers as "other acts" evidence relating to Riddick's own conduct. 
Riddick fails to cite any part of the trial record or to specify what part 
of 
McFarlane's testimony was allegedly objectionable. Thus, this claim is 
without merit. 
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C. Grand Jury Testimony 
 
Riddick appeals the district court's denial of his motion 
for a new trial by raising two arguments regarding grand 
jury testimony. Riddick claims that the contents of a 
newspaper article published six weeks before Riddick was 
indicted showed that confidential grand jury testimony by 
government witness Nigel McFarlane was leaked to the 
press in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e). The district court's 
denial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. 
Gilsenan, 949 F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 1991). This argument is 
without merit as Riddick has failed to cite any part of 
McFarlane's grand jury testimony to support his claim. 
 
Second, Riddick claims that the Government presented 
misleading testimony to the grand jury or withheld 
exculpatory testimony from the grand jury. All of the 
"examples" cited by Riddick were refuted by the actual 
transcripts of the grand jury proceedings. Thus, this 
argument is also without merit. 
 
D. Motion to Suppress Evidence 
 
Riddick also claims that the district court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress evidence from the 1994 
search of his home at 1106 1/2 Tilghman Street, on the 
grounds that: (1) the warrant contained stale facts, (2) the 
warrant failed to list with particularity the items to be 
seized, and (3) the agents seized items from 1108 Tilghman 
Street, a location not listed in the warrant. Riddick did not 
raise the first two claims in his suppression motion and 
therefore the district court's denial is reviewed for plain 
error. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). 
 
Riddick's first two claims are without merit. The warrant 
lists the items to be seized with sufficient specificity. 
Moreover, the information in the warrant was not stale; it 
showed an entrenched ongoing five-year drug operation in 
which Riddick frequently used his home to conduct cocaine 
transactions, and in which the most recent drug sale by 
one of his employees occurred only six days before the 
warrant was executed. 
 
As for Riddick's third claim, the court reviews the district 
court's denial of the motion to suppress for "clear error as 
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to the underlying facts, but exercise[s] plenary review as to 
its legality in light of the court's properly found facts." 
United States v. Inigo, 925 F.2d 641, 656 (3d Cir. 1991). 
The district court did not err in denying Riddick's motion to 
suppress all evidence seized during an August 12, 1994, 
search of his residence. Riddick failed to substantiate his 
claim that Government agents improperly searched an 
adjoining property. Rather, the suppression hearing 
testimony showed that the agents confined their search to 
the premises identified by the street address in the warrant.4 
In addition, Riddick failed to show that the Government 
used any item seized from that space against him at trial, 
rendering any error harmless. 
 
E. Illegal Monitoring of Conversations 
 
Riddick claims that the district court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress all electronic surveillance on two 
grounds. We review the district court's factual findings for 
clear error and exercise plenary review of the legal issues 
involved. Inigo, 925 F.2d at 656. First, he argues that the 
government illegally intercepted his telephone conversation 
before obtaining a court order on December 10, 1993, 
authorizing surveillance. Riddick has failed to produce any 
credible evidence of Government misconduct. Rather, the 
Government's alleged premature monitoring of 
conversations consisted solely of information from court- 
authorized pen registers5 on Riley's telephone, which 
showed a clear pattern of calls to the pagers and telephones 
of co-conspirators such as Riddick. The pen registers also 
showed that after dialing a telephone or pager number, the 
caller then entered certain additional numbers indicating 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Riddick had modified the third floor of 1106 1/2 Tilgham Street, 
expanding it into space formerly belonging to 1108 Tilgham Street. 
Riddick's alterations, however, permanently made the extra space part of 
1106 1/2 Tilgham by eliminating access to the bedroom from 1108 
Tilgham. Therefore, the agents properly searched the space under the 
authority of the warrant. 
 
5. A pen register is a "device which records or decodes electronic or 
other 
impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on 
the telephone line to which such device is attached." 18 U.S.C. S 3127 
(1994); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 654 F.2d 268, 277 n.13 
(3d Cir. 1981). 
 
                                7 
  
the price, drug quantity, or code to identify the customer.6 
Second, Riddick alleges that the Government intercepted a 
call on December 14, 1993, originating on Riddick's mobile 
phone without court authorization. The evidence shows, 
however, that the Government monitored the telephone call 
as part of the court-authorized wiretap of Riley's home 
telephone. The Government produced direct testimony 
about the monitoring of this call as part of the Riley 
wiretap, and the original pen register tape showing that call 
originated from Riley's home telephone. 
 
As none of Riddick's contentions have merit, we affirm 
the conviction. 
 
II. 
 
A. Sentencing for Distribution of Cocaine Near 
   a School 
 
The Government argues that the district court erred by 
refusing to sentence Riddick pursuant to USSG S 2D1.2, 
the Sentencing Guideline applicable for drug offenses 
occurring near a school.7 Section 2D1.2 should have been 
applied, the Government argues, because the Sentencing 
Guidelines require the use of the highest offense level 
within a group of counts. The standard of review of the 
district court's interpretation and application of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. There were recordings made prior to December 1993, but they were 
made with the consent of one of the parties to the conversation and 
Riddick has not addressed these specifically. 
 
7. Riddick argues that the Government has waived its right to appeal the 
court's failure to apply USSG S 2D1.2. Riddick relies on the 
Government's statement at the sentencing hearing, that regardless of 
whether the court sentenced Riddick under the CCE statute or the 
conspiracy statute the end result would be a life sentence, as evidence 
that the Government did not raise this guideline provision as an 
alternative sentencing option before the district court. 
 
This argument is without merit. At the conclusion of the sentencing 
hearing the district court stated "[t]he Government urges that the counts 
involving distribution near a school are not lesser included offenses to 
the continuing criminal enterprise count, and therefore, I would have the 
option . . . to sentence to the higher amount," suggesting quite clearly 
that the Government raised the issue below. 
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Sentencing Guidelines is plenary. United States v. Hallman, 
23 F.3d 821, 823 (3d Cir. 1994). The Government's 
argument is meritorious. 
 
Section 3D1.2(d) of the Sentencing Guidelines states that 
multiple counts "involving substantially the same harm 
shall be grouped together into a single Group. Counts 
involve substantially the same harm . . . when the offense 
level is determined largely on the basis of . . . the quantity 
of a substance involved." USSG S 3D1.2(d). Offenses 
covered by the USSG S 2D1.2 (distribution near a school) 
and USSG S 2D1.5 (continuing criminal enterprise offenses) 
are to be grouped together. USSG S 3D1.2(d). Moreover, in 
cases of grouping under S 3D1.2(d), "the offense guideline 
that results in the highest offense level is used." USSG 
S 3D1.2 comment. (n.6). 
 
Applied here, the counts for distribution of cocaine near 
a school (21 U.S.C. S 860(a)) and for operating a CCE (21 
U.S.C. S 848) are properly grouped together. See USSG 
S 3D1.2(d). The counts for distribution of cocaine near a 
school result in a higher offense level than the CCE count. 
While Riddick's offense level for CCE count is 42 pursuant 
to S 2D1.5,8 Riddick's offense level for distribution of 
cocaine near a school is 43. Specifically, the provision 
applicable for violations of S 860(a), USSGS 2D1.2, directs 
the court to add one offense level to "the offense level from 
S 2D1.1 applicable to the total quantity of controlled 
substances involved in the offense." USSG S 2D1.2(a)(2). 
Riddick's offense level from S 2D1.1 is 38 because the total 
quantity involved in the offense was more than 150 
kilograms of cocaine. Thus, the base offense level would be 
39, plus a 4-level increase under USSG S 3B1.1(a) for 
Riddick's role as leader or organizer of criminal activity 
involving five or more people.9 The total offense level is 43, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Sentencing Guideline S 2D1.5 applies to the CCE count. Here, the 
base offense level is 4 plus the offense level fromS 2D1.1, for a total of 
42, mandating a sentence of 360 months to life. 
 
9. Riddick did not contest the four level increase pursuant to USSG 
S 3B1.1(a) on appeal. Riddick, however, appealed the sufficiency of the 
CCE conviction involving the same facts. In part IB, supra, we concluded 
that there was sufficient evidence on this point to sustain the jury's 
verdict. 
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mandating a sentence of life imprisonment. Thus, under 
USSG S 3D1.2(d), the district court should have applied 
S 2D1.2 and sentenced Riddick to life imprisonment. 
 
The district court, however, sentenced Riddick on the 
CCE count based on its perception that operating a 
continuing criminal enterprise constituted a more serious 
offense than the offense of distributing cocaine near a 
school or playground and thus the distribution count 
merged with the CCE count for sentencing purposes. The 
district court's perception of the seriousness of the crime 
does not provide a basis on which the court may disregard 
the explicit instructions of the Sentencing Guidelines. The 
Guidelines do not direct the court to make a subjective 
determination of which count is the most severe or onerous 
in determining the sentence. See USSG S 3D1.2(d). Rather, 
the Guidelines suggest that the severity of the offense is 
fully accounted for in the court's calculation of the offense 
level. Thus, the district court erred. 
 
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that it is improper to 
impose a higher penalty for a "lesser included offense" than 
for the more serious offense, substantive predicate offenses 
involved in a CCE conviction, such as Riddick's violation of 
21 U.S.C. S 860(a) for distributing cocaine in the vicinity of 
a school, are not lesser included offenses of the CCE count. 
The issue of whether one count is the lesser included 
offense of another arises when the court is confronted with 
two distinct statutory provisions applicable to the same 
criminal act. In such a situation, the court will look at 
"whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact 
which the other does not." Blockburger v. United States, 284 
U.S. 299, 304 (1932). The traditional test does not apply, 
however, where "there is a clear indication of contrary 
legislative intent." United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 931 
F.2d 148, 154 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Missouri v. Hunter, 
459 U.S. 359, 367 (1983)). As the Supreme Court stated in 
Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (1985), "[t]he 
language, structure, and legislative history of the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse, Prevention and Control Act of 
1970, . . . show in the plainest way that Congress intended 
the CCE provision to be a separate criminal offense which 
was punishable in addition to, and not as a substitute for, 
the predicate offenses." 
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Further, the language of Garrett is not contradicted by 
Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 300 (1996), in 
which the Court held that conspiracy to distribute 
controlled substances is a lesser included offense of the 
CCE offense because the conspiracy count does not require 
proof of any fact that is not also an element of the CCE 
count. Thus, a sentence for conspiracy to distribute 
controlled substances in addition to a concurrent CCE 
offense sentence amounted to an improper cumulative 
second punishment. Id. at 302-03. Rutledge, however, 
explicitly distinguished Garrett as a case"adher[ing] to our 
understanding that legislatures have traditionally perceived 
a qualitative difference between conspiracy-like crimes and 
the substantive offenses upon which they are 
predicated. . . . In contrast to the crime[ ] [of importing 
marijuana] involved in Garrett, this case involves two 
conspiracy-like offenses directed at largely identical 
conduct." Id. at 301 n.12. 
 
As various Courts of Appeals decisions recognize, the 
Supreme Court has made clear that while a defendant may 
not be sentenced, even concurrently, to both a conspiracy 
conviction and a CCE conviction because one is the lesser 
included offense of the other, the same rule does not apply 
when the predicate offense is a separate substantive 
offense. Substantive predicate offenses do not merge with 
the CCE count. See United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 
278, 287 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating in dicta that under Garrett, 
the Double Jeopardy clause does not bar cumulative 
punishments for CCE and underlying substantive predicate 
offenses); Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d at 154 (finding no 
constitutional impediment to the imposition of cumulative 
sentences on the CCE count and on the predicate 
substantive count of aiding and abetting); United States v. 
Morrow, 929 F.2d 566, 568 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that 
the manufacture of methamphetamine count was not the 
lesser included offense of the CCE count, court affirmed 
sentence imposed on manufacture count); United States v. 
Jones, 918 F.2d 909, 909-10 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that 
"[w]hen the predicate act is a substantive violation of the 
narcotics laws, as distribution is, the substantive violation 
does not merge into the CCE count"). 
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Thus, the district court was not precluded from 
sentencing Riddick on the counts for distribution of cocaine 
near a school. Accordingly, we conclude that the district 
court erred by failing to sentence Riddick to life 
imprisonment pursuant to USSG S 2D1.2 for his conviction 
under 21 U.S.C. S 860(a) and for his role as an organizer 
pursuant to USSG S 3B1.1(a). 
 
Riddick's challenge to the district court's factualfindings 
does not affect the court's conclusion. Riddick argues that 
even if the court concludes that he is to be sentenced under 
USSG S 2D1.2, he should not receive a life sentence. 
Riddick bases this claim on his belief that the court made 
the erroneous factual finding that 150 kilograms of cocaine 
were attributable to him. With an accurate assessment of 
the quantity of cocaine a lower base offense level would 
apply and would preclude a sentence of life in prison. 
 
As proof of the inaccuracies, Riddick states that the court 
added quantities for which there was no record evidence 
presented or dates setting forth when the transactions 
occurred. Even allowing for the 75 kilograms assessed to 
him in 1993, Riddick argues that the Government can 
prove that he distributed no more than 108.75 kilograms of 
cocaine and even this amount was based on improperly 
drawn inferences from testimony of a man who was in 
prison for at least part of the time he was allegedly making 
sales to Riddick. Finally, Riddick contends that any 
conclusion that he was responsible for the total quantity of 
drugs involved in the CCE was in error because the district 
court did not make a finding that it was reasonable to 
impute knowledge of all the conspiracy's criminal conduct 
to him. As indicated previously, however, the district court 
made clear factual findings based on equally clear 
reasoning. Riddick has presented nothing to suggest that 
the court's detailed factual finding that he was responsible 
for 150 kilograms of cocaine, an estimate significantly lower 
than either that of the Government or of the probation 
officer, is clearly erroneous. 
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III. 
 
In sum, we affirm the conviction, vacate the sentence, 
and remand for resentencing in accordance with this 
opinion. 
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